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Abstract
Law and Economics literature recently gazed upon the “failure of
judges” showing the various biases, psychological but also political,
they can display. One of the seminal criticisms against bankruptcy
judges focused on their attempt to go beyond the strict applications
of law in their decisions. The main drawback is their lack of business-
related expertise. The French bankruptcy system was created four
centuries ago with this last problem in mind and remains unique to-
day. The bankruptcy judges are elected among local businessmen and
top executives. They rule without any professional judge along them,
like in mixed courts in Belgium. They are given a key role in the de-
cision as in the U.S.. This chapter shows how judges display a home
bias when the area suffers from economic turmoil. They attempt to fa-
vor the reorganization of bankrupt firms when the local unemployment
rate is high. The analysis is based on an original dataset of all filings
for restructuring (Redressement Judiciaire) from 2006 to 2013. This is
shown to hold robust despite several tests using survival analysis in a
competing risk setting. This effect is found to reduce the time of nego-
tiation between the firm and its creditors with no effect on the survival
of the firm after the reorganization plan was agreed upon. We infer
that judges cram-down decisions faster in these contexts and let cred-
itors bear the costs of these reorganisations. It underlines how Courts
wish to implement decisions that exceed solely debt-collection with a
concern for the local area at the risk of hurting the firm’s creditors.
JEL-Classification: G33, H73, K22
Keywords: Bankruptcy, Judge, Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their
Effects
1 Introduction
French bankruptcy system is widely quoted as both an example of civil tra-
dition and pro-continuation (or pro-debtor) system in L&E. But one of its
unique feature is rarely studied, its bankruptcy judges. In France, they are
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not professional judges but consular judges. They are local executives and
entrepreneurs working voluntarily for the court and elected in each jurisdic-
tion1. This system has existed for four centuries and has resisted to major
changes for two main reasons (Montebourg and F. 1998) : judges are legit-
imated by their knowledge and this organization is cost and time efficient.
France thus offers a unique system where judges avoid many of the crit-
ics which should explain the “failure of judges” (Shleifer 2012) : they are
experts, elected for their skills, and for a finite time – a 4-year mandate,
renewable thrice, for a maximum of fourteen years. At the same time, they
play a key role in the decision making. Similarly to the U.S., the French
system is court-administered and judges can cram-down decisions towards
the creditors, e.g. if a firm files for restructuring, the judge can force them
upon a restructuring plan.
Blazy et al. 2011 showed how the decisions of French bankruptcy judges
are in line with the firm’s interest like they are supposed to2 – but “social
considerations prevail in the arbitration”. When choosing between alter-
native buying offers of a bankrupt firm, they “consider financial issues as
well the ones preserving the highest number of employees before the offer
price”. This behavior is expected since French law itself ranks the aims of
bankruptcy in a similar way: first the protection of employment, then the
pursue of the firm’s activity and last the write-off of debts. These results
are based on the sole firm’s characteristics and the judge does not pursue
any other motive here than the firm’s interest. The authors also confirm the
findings in LoPucki and Doherty 2007 that the proceeding’s outcome does
not affect global recovery rates. Yet, we reckon here that judges make their
decisions having in mind the negative impact they can have on non-investors,
the employees but also the commercial partners of the firms including her
suppliers and customers. These judgments may thus prioritize social inter-
est, in particular local unemployment rate with less concerns on the other
stakeholders the creditors. The judges’ decision to liquidate the firm that
applied for restructuring first affects the local economy of the jurisdiction.
As local entrepreneurs, they are well aware of the economic context at the
time of decision. By law, the objective function of the court takes only into
account the stakeholders of the firms (employees, investors, creditors). We
wonder whether they add to their objective function external factors. This
would be explained by them being elected locally and being sensitive to these
external factors due to their job.
We test whether courts change their decisions depending on the local
economic context, in particular if they prevent firms to shut down in time
of economic turmoil. The aim here is to show that the specific nature of
1Except in three legal districts – Alsace-Moselle – which maintain an échevinage system
where the courts are composed by a mix of professional judges and elected professionals
like in Belgium or Switzerland
2Vallens2006
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French judges could help them favour social interest. French bankruptcy
judges often claim pragmatism as fairness to be core values which explain
how they interpret the law3. French courts may choose to depart from a
strict application of law. They could take liberty and choose to implement
what they define as efficient rulings, which would have the least harmful
impact on the local economy.
Seeing bankruptcy as more than a debt-collection process, but a re-
distributive policy-solution which integrates “non-investors” interest, was
deemed particularly prejudicial in the case of the U.S.. Yet this criticism was
mainly motivated by the nature of U.S. bankruptcy judges, being civil ser-
vants (Frost 1995). Through their knowledge and networks, consular judges
may be able to overcome some of these limits. This paper does not wish
to question the principles judges should base their decision upon4. We are
solely interested on how the judges’s status may help them apprehend – or
think they can – the overall social impact of their decisions. We wish to anal-
yse how these deviations from decisions based on the firm’s characteristics
affect the firm and its creditors.
Our paper relates to the legal realism literature. We question various bi-
ases that affect the rulings, such as the economic environment of the court.
There are controversial results on how the economic context may change the
resulting judgment. The main concern is for law to be applied in the same
way for all citizens and across the entire national territory. Two papers show
opposite results. Ichino, Polo, and Rettore 2003 find Courts to be more fa-
vorable to workers in higher unemployment context. Marinescu 2011 uses a
1992 survey on U.K. employment tribunals and finds that both unemploy-
ment and bankruptcy rates significantly decrease the chances for a judgment
to be in favor of dismissed employees thus being more sensitive to the firms’
interest.
The above strand of the literature assumes that judges do not simply ap-
ply the law but cover their judgments with a political dimension – expressing
their beliefs or even implicit biases5. Ben-Ishai and Lubben 2011 in this re-
gard states that the U.S. reorganisation bankruptcy process, Chapter 11,
has been an efficient government tool to provide support to the automotive
industry. The rulings can also be swayed because of direct political pressure
as proven by the study by Lambert-Mogiliansky, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya
2007 on Russian Commercial Courts after the enforcement of the new 1998
bankruptcy law. They demonstrated how the regional governor affected the
3As documented in Lazega and Mounier 2009; Lazega 2009 based on their interviews
of Parisian bankruptcy judges.
4On the subject, see Lyon-Caen and Urban 1990. Also Lazega 2009 has reckoned –
based on direct interviews – that the judges in Commercial Courts apply their decision
following principles similar to Posner’s legal pragmatism Posner 1993.
5See Irwin and Real 2010; Kang et al. 2011 for a review on how they form and can
affect decisions
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decisions of the courts because of how judges’ career are dependent on these
regional authorities. Both papers rehabilitate the political dimension of these
decisions though it is supposed here that judgments are not swayed by the
judges’ motives but by the general system.
But the particularity of French consular judges makes them susceptible to
peer-pressure. In Lazega 2009, the author has attended interviews with most
of the judges in Paris Commercial Court. He shows the judges’ punitivity and
interventionism in the judicial process vary strongly and can be linked with
their past career and specifically in which business area they worked. Such
a statement seems reinforced by their being elected through the sponsorship
of their employer’s association or their business sector’s association. It is
not necessarily an explicit peer-pressure and it could be explained through
industry-specific representations that affect their statements.
We look at all restructuring filings 6 that happened from 2006 to 20137.
This gave us access to 65,899 cases over the period, in the jurisdictions with
only non-professional judges. We check whether an increase of the local un-
employment rate heightens the chances of an agreement on a reorganization
plan. The judge has to choose among several options after the filing : enforce
a reorganization plan ; convert the restructuring to a liquidation proceeding,
generally ending in a piecemeal sale ; selling the firm as a going concern. The
firm can also end up being liquidated because of lack of assets (insuffisance
d’actifs) because of its economic distress during the judicial process. Since
the judges can cram down the decision, they can choose which option to
enforce.
The effect of local unemployment is tested with a survival analysis model
on the different outcomes after filing. An increase in local unemployment rate
is found to increase the transition hazard of a reorganization plan. This result
holds robust after a battery of tests which confirms that the estimates are not
driven by alternative channels. In particular we control for differential effects
over time which may be driven by the industry, the size or other specifics of
the models we use. Our aim is to pin down the sole local economic effect not
affected by these potential other biases.
This increase in the hazard rate of reorganisation plan implies that the
observation period8 is shorter. Bankruptcy in France, like in the US, starts
with automatic stay, an automatic injunction that halts actions by creditors
to collect debts. Less time in bankruptcy means that the time during which
the creditors remain without payments is reduced. But it also implies that
6Redressement Judiciaire
7This period covers two financial crises, the aftermath of the subprime crisis and the
Eurozone debt crisis. This is why we always control our local economic variable to national
ones in order to test for these local variations each time
8The observation period of a reorganisation is the period after the filing when the firm
lists her debts, negotiates with her creditors and may offer a reorganisation plan that the
court must agree upon.
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the time of negotiation is reduced. Since we control with financial ratios, this
result holds irrespective of the financial situation of the firm. Cramming-
down decision by court probably becomes more frequent.
There are multiple arguments in favour of this analysis. Our study covers
eight years and most secured creditors like bank are national and not local.
The assumption that at times of local economic turmoil secured creditors
agree to alleviate some of the charges may not seem plausible. What’s more,
the liquidation bias of creditors is documented (see for example Blazy and
Chopard 2012). According to Sharfman 2004, US bankruptcy judges show
loss-aversion bias that lead them to taking decisions in favor of debtors. Last,
if the reorganisation plan were more demanding for the firm, this could have
an effect on the firm’s survival. We check whether these deviations affect
the survival of a firm after the plan was agreed upon 9. We define failure as
the proceeding being converted into Liquidation or the firm is shut down .
We find no such effect, judges do not let any firm being reorganized but are
apparently more lax on the conditions regardless of the impact on the firm’s
creditors. Reorganization plans generally stretch for ten years so this effect
may be driven by lack of history in our data.
This result implies that part of the reorganisation costs are increasingly
taken by creditors in time of turmoil. This can have externality on the
credit-lending process. When facing local economic turmoil, some creditors
should me less willing to finance some projects, with the risk of a shortage in
credit-lending. Judges may justify to first deal with the firm at the utmost
risk in a particularly stressing environment. They may also consider that
the creditors at risk are not directly under their supervision – either because
they are nationwide or because they depend on other jurisdictions. Another
explanation inspired by the work of Iverson 2017 is that the judges are being
stressed by the increase in bankruptcy caseloads that is consecutive to the
economic turmoil. They may prefer to delay the decision to shut down
the firm afterward and choose the “default” solution, i.e. the reorganization
plan. To check the possibility of case overload, we include the number of past
proceedings over the last 12 months before a firm has filed. This decision
by default should imply an increase in liquidation for the firms that were
prolonged because of the changes in local environment.
Together, these results confirm that there are deviations in judgment
because of a troubled local economic context. These changes impact only
the firm’s creditors and not its survival. Our findings relate to the contro-
versial results mentioned before and ascertain the impact of the economic
environment on decisions, following Ichino, Polo, and Rettore 2003.
Finally our results also relate to the question of “continuation bias” in
pro-continuation systems such as the U.S.’s. It was widely criticized because
9We had chosen to test for survival rather than the usual recidivism rate since the
turnover to bankruptcy is less frequent in France than for the U.S. Chapter 11.
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it was thought too debtor-friendly which explained the wish of a reform
in 2005. Nonetheless Morrison 2007 or Warren and Westbrook 2007 and
Warren and Westbrook 2008 proved the high screening ability of American
Courts and the short delays it took in deciding. However some papers show
that pro-debtor decisions could be driven by behavioural bias such as loss-
aversion (Sharfman 2004) or even lack of experience (Iverson et al. 2019).
This questions the opposition between “Proceduralists” vs. “Traditionalists”
(Ferriell and Janger 2013) on the need for judges to help rescuing businesses
despite potential cost for creditors. The latter view bankruptcy as “a delib-
erate distributional policy in favor of all those whom a business failure would
have hurt” (Warren 2004).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives more back-
ground about the specifics of the judges in French Commercial courts and
on the local implementation of these Courts. Section 3 describes our empiri-
cal strategy. Section 4 provides information on the data used in the samples.
Section 5 analyses the impact of local unemployment on the decisions and
its effect on the firms’ survival. We conclude in section 6.
2 Bankruptcy outcome decisions in the literature
2.1 French bankruptcy proceedings and the course of Re-
dressement Judiciaire
To understand how Court’s decisions affect bankruptcy, one needs to look at
the two possible motives when filing for bankruptcy: terminating the firm
seen as nonviable or pursuing its activity. Each country offers a menu of
proceedings that correspond with these two motives: in the U.S. Chapter
11 for continuation and Chapter 7 for termination; in France, Redressement
– around a third of all filings a year – or Sauvegarde 10 and Liquidation
– around two thirds of all filings a year11. Since 2015, Redressement as
Liquidation needs the firm to be insolvent12 for less than 45 days (rather
than 15 days before).
A judgment opening for Redressement must be settled within 12 months
after filing. Exceptionally, it can be extended twice, for 6 months each time.
A filing should not last more than 24 months without a decision from the
court. As soon as the firm files into bankruptcy, the firm is in an automatic
stay of payment until a decision is made by the Court. Automatic stay
prevents the firm’s situation to aggravate by stopping the reimbursements
of its creditors. From the filing for Redressement, 7 out of 10 cases fail to
10Inspired by Chapter 11, this proceeding only accounts for 1.5% of all proceedings a
year. We choose to focus solely on Redressement.
11Source : Altares D&B
12Insolvency is defined in France as “the impossibility of being able to meet liabilities
due from available assets”.
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reorganize and are either converted into a Liquidation proceeding or even
closed ; around 5 to 6 % of firms end up sold as a going concern and around
one-fourth manage to agree on a continuation plan 13.
The statistics on the time required to reach an outcome after filing are
reported in Table 3. They are in line with similar figures reported by Morri-
son 2007; Warren and Westbrook 2008 for U.S. cases. Indeed, the transition
from a Redressement case towards a Liquidation happens fast: in half of the
ases within 11 weeks. Such statement underlines that there is no waste of
time with non-professional judges compared to professional ones.
From the filing, an administrator is appointed by the court – an admin-
istrateur judiciaire14. She replaces the firm’s manager : she is in charge
of the management of bankrupt firms ; she must at the same time super-
vise and control all the firm’s actions. She reports directly her actions to
the court (to a specific bankruptcy judge called juge commissaire). She also
provides insight on the opportunity for the firm to be reorganized. A specific
bankruptcy judge, the creditor representative (mandataire judiciaire), rep-
resents the creditors’ interest, assesses proofs of claims, and can be assisted
by supervising creditors (créanciers contrôleurs). Only the Court eventually
decides a reorganization plan or, on the contrary, allows for the piecemeal
liquidation or the sale of the firm. The bankruptcy process is completely
“court-administered” (Blazy et al. 2011) and the creditors may at most be
given a advisory role.
2.2 Role and specifics of French bankruptcy judges
Bankruptcy judges are not paid for their services. They voluntarily apply
for the position when sponsored by an employer’s association. the court
is self-selected, the election is decided by sitting judges and members of
the Chamber of Commerce of the local jurisdiction. This specific status is
supposed to help them better understand business issues than would legal
experts. We must stress out although they are elected, these non-professional
judges follow a legal training and cannot sit in a bankruptcy Court until two
years after their first election. They are first elected for two years then four
years with at most four successive mandates.
Judges are competent on two fields: disputes and assisting distressed
firms. The latter encompasses the prevention of bankruptcy and the bankruptcy
process itself. The court is composed of three to five bankruptcy judges under
the authority of a president, who is elected for four years among her peers.
The court accepts the filing for bankruptcy, which initiates the bankruptcy
process. It also selects if the firm can be reorganized or should be directly
liquidated in case it is insolvent. After the observation period15, the court
13Source: ALTARES, L’entreprise en difficulté en France
14a numerus clausus profession
15Six months renewable twice
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will decide the fate of the firm (reorganisation, sale, or liquidation). The
president remains the same but the other judges may change along these
two decisions. The bankruptcy process is lead by an insolvency judge called
juge commissaire. She will allow or forbid management decisions proposed
by the firm’s judicial administrator. All these judges are consular judges,
even the president (except in Alsace-Moselle with its mixed courts as in
Belgium), and their role can change depending on the case.
Their decisions can be challenged through the court of Appeal, where only
professional judges sit. Yet these appeals are relatively infrequent (4.5% of
the cases16). This statistics is seen as a proof of the efficiency of bankruptcy
Courts in deciding.
The key feature in terms of legitimacy is their proximity to business envi-
ronment. Thanks to their experience, consular judges should be more likely
to understand business problems than professional judges (civil servants) and
to monitor the company’s action, particularly in cases of financial distress
(Carruthers and Halliday 1998). Their experience also allow them to under-
stand specific industry customs (called usages in French commercial courts)
which contribute to organizing business practice, but are often ignored in
business law. Thanks to experience sharing, all judges are able to adapt to
the specifics of each industry.
Consular judges are deemed “natural judges of the economy” by their own
association (Conférence Générale des Juges Consulaires). To understand
how important this representation is, one can refer to the interviews Lazega
(2009) had with the Parisian consular judges. Though not equally shared, a
large number of judges believe their judgments should preserve equity and
fairness, and emphasize that they want their decisions to be practical. This
opinion is enhanced by their business-affiliation which should grant them an
“economic” point of view rather than a “legal” one, which should be reflected
through their decisions (see the reported remarks of the judges p187-188 in
Lazega and Mounier 2009). Obviously all judges do not share this line of
thinking as many may have a strong connection with the law and thus are
more likely to watch for its strict application. For example, twenty-four
out of the one hundred and fifty one judges that Lazega and Mounier 2009
interviewed were jurists/bankers who displayed a strong knowledge in legal
questions to the point that they advised their peers on some subjects.
3 Identification strategy
To test the motivations of bankruptcy judges, we focus on the decisions after
the filing i.e. whether the court defends a continuation plan, the sale as a
going concern or simply the liquidation of the firm. The model analyses
16Source : appeal rate in 1999 and 2000 for bankruptcy decisions ruled in 1999 Girod
2002
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successive transitions 17. We face three main issues trying to tackle the
effect of local environment. We need to separate the effect of the local
economic context from economic changes, at the national or at an industry-
level. Also though the judges are similarly appointed, the jurisdictions may
display many variations in size and culture. The last issue is that the timing
of judgments is not entirely set beforehand and a decision to eventually
liquidate a firm is taken more quickly than when the decision is to reorganize
the firm.
The question raised requires many control variables of the decision by
judges. Public information – available for all firms in the sample – is diverse.
It gives the firm’s age, its localization, its size (number of employees), its ori-
gin (as a new business for example) and its legal form. Several environment
variables are used – some on an industry level, others at the macro level and
finally two at the local level (unemployment rate and new firm creation rate).
The firm’s economic environment is mostly used to approximate the firm’s
future value. Various business-sector descriptors were used in the literature,
market-wide – such as in Partington and Kim 2008 or in Hoi Fung Ng 2007;
industry-wide such as in Ayadi-Ben Lakhal 2011 or even economic-wide such
as in Gutiérrez, Olmo, and Azofra 2012. Here, we consider two economic
variables – national growth and local new firm creation rate over the last
three years – to check whether the effect of local unemployment on reorgani-
zation is not actually due to changes in the economy. We want to estimate
the sole effect of unemployment rate under constant economic conditions.
The local unemployment rate is given at the French department-level and is
quarterly-based. The creation rate of firms at the department-level also is
also computed over the last 36 months. It is a good proxy of the local activity
dynamics and most past studies show that the delayed effect in bankruptcy
of an increase in firm creation rate is to be expected after 3 years in France
(Desurvire 2000).
For the industry-level variables, the Banque de France18 provides the
evolution of many financial ratios over time. These ratios are average ratios
dealing with profitability, the weight of labour and of debt but also the
share of interest bearing debts in overall debt. The information on trade
debt is not significant in our models. The ratios covers nine distinct business
sectors on a yearly basis. Using these variables, we can assess whether a
business sector is dynamic, and how bank-dependent it may be, which may
also have an impact on the chances of reorganization. We also want to
prevent the local unemployment effect to be driven by national changes.
17The possibility of a direct closure of the proceeding is also informed in the data but
not interpreted here. This situation is a simple statement – the firm is found to have not
enough asset to pursue its activity – there is relative no other possible decision from the
court’s perspective. Direct liquidation accounts for around two-thirds of the filings each
year (Source : Altares).
18The French Central Bank
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Therefore, we perform the same analysis adding the national unemployment
rate as covariate (see Table 14).
The last issue in tackling the local effect is the risk of structural changes
in the bankrupt firms. Three years after the 2007 crisis, more and more large
firms tend to file in bankruptcy because of cash shortfall, and the chances of
reorganization are affected these changes in the nature of firms. The most
efficient way to challenge this problem is to use financial information for each
firm but they are available for half the firms in the population (see Table
1). In addition, these financial ratios are not equally available for all sizes
of firms as shown in Table 10 : lack of financial information happens mostly
to firms with no employees which display less financial information than the
rest the rest of the population (28% vs. 53% on average). We test whether
our results change by weighting the firms by size, by adding an interaction
term in our model and we find that the results remain the same.
We also aim to assess whether the courts do not change their decisions
process because of work-overload. If there is an increase in local unemploy-
ment rate, it may be due to an increase in the number of caseloads the
court must face. We could think, inspired by Iverson 2017 that changes in
judgment may be due to this stress. The judges decide to increase the time
to decision and even choose the default alternative, i.e. the reorganization
plan, to delay the shutting down of the firm. To check for potential increase
in bankruptcy filings, we add the number of past proceedings in the last
12 months. And we assess a bias toward default decision by looking at the
survival of the firm after a reorganization plan was agreed upon.
The main reasons for choosing survival analysis over the usual logistic
regressions are to take into account censored data, i.e. firms for which judicial
decisions are still lacking, and to show the effect of covariates on the duration
of the proceeding. Though extended to a six-year horizon, the time-coverage
is not enough to follow all filings from onset to closure, a reorganization
plan generally lasting for 10 years. All other statistical models would need
assumption on these observations and thus would bias the results. We choose
a competing risk setting19 rather than the more often used mortality model
(Hougaard 1999) with only one possible outcome, survival versus failure
(e.g. Denis and Rodgers 2007; Hoi Fung Ng 2007). Competing risk suits
more the trajectory in a judicial path. In such setting, the termination date
of a process is not reduced to the transition to a single event but rather to
the transition from a state to another among different choices. Competing
risk setting assumes a competition between the alternatives. Indeed, there
is a competition in the possible duration of each alternative: after filing,
creditors, suppliers, customers and even employees do not know whether
the firm will be continued, sold or liquidated ; the higher the chances of
liquidation, the less time a firm would have to offer a suitable reorganisation
19see Lancaster 1992; Hougaard 1999; Beyersmann, Allignol, and Schumacher 2012.
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plan.
This setting also increases the explanatory power of the effects of the
covariates on each alternative (Beyersmann, Allignol, and Schumacher 2012;
Astebro and Winter 2012 in the case of bankruptcy). This effect would be
blurred by a two-alternative model opposing closure to survival. For instance,
the size of the firm, is known to influence the decision in different ways: the
chances to agree on a continuation plan increase with the firm’s size until
a threshold where the firm is most probably sold. Competing risk setting
has already been used to study the aftermath of French reorganization plans
(Ayadi-Ben Lakhal 2011) to determine whether the firms end up being sold,
closed or if it manages to survive. We were inspired by this work when we
tested the survival of the firm after it agrees on a continuation plan.
Table 1: Breakdown of events for financial information availability
This table provides the breakdown of events depending on available financial
information in the 24 months before filing for bankruptcy. More than half of
firms display financial information.
Obs No financials Financials
Censored 4,133 35% 65%
Liquidated 34,157 57% 43%
Closed 10,054 56% 44%
Sold 3,192 23% 77%
Plan 14,363 27% 73%
Total 65,899 47% 53%
To challenge these questions, we use a Cox model. It models the hazard
rate, i.e. the probability to leave some state at a specific time knowing you
were still in this state. It models an instantaneous probability of switching
states. The main reason to choose a Cox model is its simplicity in modeling:
we assume two components in the hazard rate, a non-parametric part called
baseline hazard, λOj(t) and a parametric component that depends on the
covariates, Z.
α0j(t) = λ0j(t) exp(βZ) (1)
Despite simplicity, the model makes a strong assumption, the Proportion-
ality Hypothesis which states that the relative hazard rates of two different
individuals is solely explained by the parametric part of the model. The
difference in hazard rate20 between two firms only depend on the variables
tested in the model. In equation, this means that for (k, l) two different
individuals, we have:
20The hazard rate considered only models the transition towards the same alternative,
i.e. from the filing to a continuation plan or to liquidation.
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α(0j,k)(t)
α(0j,l)(t)
=
exp(βZk)
exp(βZl)
(2)
The court’s dummy variables deviate from this assumption. This means
that the court’s effect from one court relative to another vary over time. One
explanation of this issue is differences in organisation. French bankruptcy
courts can be composed by nine judges (like in Saverne, Ajaccio or Gap in
2014) to 172 judges (in Paris)21. Such changes in size have implications all
along the course of the bankruptcy. To resolve this issue, we stratified with
the courts as strata. Each non-parametric part of our Cox model differs
for each Court. This also allows us to assume that each Court may have
different timing because for example of differences in size. Let us recall that
Paris Commercial Court saw 7% of 2013 filings while the 44 smallest Courts
represented only 10% of all filings. The drawback of this model is the risk
of a decrease in the significance of coefficients.
Inspired by the local legal culture, we test for different “trends” in the
court’s decisions. We question whether some decision patterns may be ac-
counted for, asking if a Court that enforces more reorganization proceedings
than liquidations tend to judge differently a bankrupt firm. To identify a
possible rescuing culture in each Court, we compute the share of direct Liq-
uidation in the number of filings and the share of Sauvegarde. We assume the
share of direct Liquidation is a good proxy of the relative punitivity versus
interventionism culture in the court (see Lazega and Mounier 2009). The
more the court accepts that firms file for reorganisation (instead of direct
Liquidation), the more it seems ready to intervene on bankruptcy.
Survival analysis also allows for inclusion of unaccounted effects in each
subgroup, with a shared-frailty model (Hougaard 1999; Rondeau and Gonza-
lez 2005). It is well suited in cases of different centers of trials with possible
different performances of each center. As such, the model fits well our goal
to understand the weight of the local environment. Such model is particu-
larly useful for assuming unobserved heterogeneity inside the clusters, e.g.
the trial centers. By clustering, the models allows for autocorrelation be-
tween the errors inside the cluster. It is convenient for our analysis since we
implicitly assume that judgments affect each other in each Court.
Shared-frailty models use a parametric multiplicative component in the
hazard rate. The underlying idea is to model a random effect that affect
the observations because of clustering issues, e.g. it may be pupils belonging
to schools with different characteristics or patients with doctors of differ-
ent skills. The method has been debated for a systematic use but is well
performing to check for these common effects on the individuals.
This complements our set of Court characteristics and the variance of the
random effect gives us insights on the extent to which the court’s characteris-
21Source : Conférence générale des juges consulaires
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tics explain the decisions. The higher its variance, the more the cluster effect
explains the evolution of the hazard rate. The results are reported in Table
13. The heterogeneity effect is assumed to follow a Gamma distribution of
ω parameter. Due to this assumption these models are also more sensitive
to correlation issues than the original Cox models. Because of this, we took
out from the modeling the number of past filings. The parametric assump-
tion in the heterogeneity forces us to use it as a complementary approach to
validate the effect of local unemployment rate. We add a frailty, ωi, for each
Court i. The frailty ω is supposed to follow a gamma distribution. Formally,
the hazard rate — assuming a similar form than in a Cox model — can be
written as follow.
α0j(t) = λ0j(t)ωi exp(βZ) (3)
The last concern in our identification strategy is the discrepancies in
length between outcomes after the filing. While the average time for a firm
to be shut off or liquidated is 20 weeks, it takes around 50 weeks to decide on
a reorganization plan. This is mainly because of the bargaining issues that
are implied with such a plan. In other words, finding a consensus to support
the plan takes time. Because of this, the environment at filing may not be
the one that defines the judges’ decision. The court must reunite after 12
months to decide on the opportunity of the reorganization, and again every
6 months, up to twice, if no decision was reached. That is why the state of
the economic environment at each meeting must better explain the decisions,
especially if it takes one year for a plan to be agreed upon, rather than the
economy at the filing. Yet we have no information on the moment the courts
meet again on each case.
Survival analysis is really flexible with timing issues and allows one to
model the effect of time-dependent covariates. From the filing, we take into
account the environment of the firm every three months until a decision is
reached and we update the values of the environment covariates : variation
in GDP, unemployment rate and creation rate. This is allowed by survival
analysis since we can “cut” the time process and consider that the observation
is censored until the time of the event is reached. We will use time-dependent
coefficients in all our models after a first check of the effect of the covariates
at filing (see Table 16).
4 Data and summary statistics
In this section, we describe the sources of our data (4.1) and display sum-
mary statistics on our sample with breakdowns by outcomes, size, financial
information availability (4.2).
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4.1 Sources
The data are drawn from all French jurisdictions. It covers all Redressement
Judiciaire filings after the 2006 reform of bankruptcy law to 2013.
Data following bankruptcy from their onset are scarcely found. Two
limits can be generally found in the literature: year-selection or sample se-
lection. In the first case, only a few years of filing are analyzed in particular
(Morrison 2007 or Warren and Westbrook 2007 and Warren and Westbrook
2008 or Levratto, Tessier, and Zouikri 2011) covering a longer period with
the risk of strong bias selection depending on the economic climate. A few
paper cross-analyzes several subsequent years, such as Denis and Rodgers
2007, Hoi Fung Ng 2007 or Ayadi-Ben Lakhal 2011. Their downward is then
the limits of their sample which is either focused on a single jurisdiction
(Paris for AYADI-BENLAKHAL2011, Chicago for Morrison 2007) or on a
short sample – only listed companies for Denis and Rodgers 2007; Hoi Fung
Ng 2007.
In France, three potential legal sources can provide information on bankruptcy
proceedings. ALTARES-D&B provided all events registered by these data
sources – the official bulletin of civil and commercial notices (BODACC),
the National Commercial Registry (RNCS) and legal notices 22. For the
economic variables at the macro and department level, we used information
provided by INSEE. The GDP growth is computed over 12 months on a
monthly basis and the national unemployment rate computed on a quarterly
basis.
The study is concerned with all commercial firms 23. Ten business sec-
tors24 are selected for the study. They encompass all the productive sectors.
Only public services, the art industry, the food industry and the financial
services were ruled out. The latter two – though important – cannot be
treated because of differences in accounting and in the bankruptcy process.
Most of the available information on firms is given either by the na-
tional census bureau – Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes
Economiques (INSEE) or the commercial registry. The financial variables
are given with the balance sheet. Though mandatory for most firms, more
than half do not publish them and it specially depends on their size and
their business sector25. The availability of financial information can bias the
22ALTARES-D&B also crosschecks the consistency of each legal notice.
23We have excluded sole proprietorship, i.e. entrepreneurs without a distinct legal per-
son
24To derive this, we use the sections of activity code proposed by the French census bu-
reau, the NAF code. We select Manufacturing, Construction; Wholesale & Retail; Trans-
portation & Storage; Accommodation & food services; Information & Communication;
Real estate activities; Administrative & support activities; Education; Arts, entertain-
ment & recreation industry; Energy, Water, Waste management.
25For instance wholesalers or supermarket chains would rather avoid sharing their mar-
gins and as such seldom publish.
14
results. The firms with available balance sheet tend to have lower default
rates and higher chances of survival after default.
We have decided to add the firms with balance sheet as old as 24 months
before the filing. This is in line with most bankruptcy scoring analyses. We
use the information provided by Altares-D&B. As shown in Table 7, half of
balance sheet were less than 11 months old at the time of filing and the three
fourths are 16 months old.
4.2 Summary statistics
The characteristics of firms filing for reorganization resembles the French
overall firms. Four out of five firms have fewer than 10 employees and the
most common legal form is firm with limited liability company. Most of
the time, the courts face small firms and most probably local businesses but
most of them still have employment issues. As we can see in table 5, 60%
of the firms have between 1 and 10 employees. The decision to liquidate the
firm will have an impact on employees, local unemployment, and will affect
the court’s environment. Because of their daily jobs, bankruptcy judges are
in direct contact with this reality.
Looking at the statistics by business sector in Table 9, the firms in the
sample do not show many differences except for the Manufacturing sector.
The discrepancies rather lie within the size of the firms as shown in Table
10. Only two-thirds of the firms with financial information have less than 10
employees vs. nearly three quarters for the whole population.
More than half firms with more than 50 employees have a balance sheet
available. The availability of a balance sheet is the proof of a sound situation,
which can be explained by size issues. The firms with available balance sheet
are larger and may show a survival bias. The second sample will be used to
confirm insights obtained with the whole population.
We use common ratios and accounting measures to take into account
the situation of the firm. We include measures of profitability (profitability
margin), of size (the logarithm of total assets), of trade debt (logarithm of
payables). Table 7 shows how poor-performing most bankrupt forms are by
looking at their profitability margin : only 25% of the firms have their profits
above 2% of their turnover. Looking at the standard-deviations, they also
widely differ in size, in their trade debt but also in their amount of fixed
assets.
5 Econometric analysis
As shown in the summary statistics, the firms with available financial infor-
mation present a selection bias. To solve this bias, our analysis proceeds in
two steps. We check for all the main options – reorganization plan (1), sale
as a going concern (2) or liquidation (3) – first on the whole population (a)
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and then on the sample with available financials (b). The second test is thus
a checkout from the first conclusion taking into account that the impact of
some covariates can evolve along the time of the bankruptcy. For example,
the profit margin of the firm could be important only at the filing ; or it
could be a good proxy of the profit margin along the bankruptcy process.
We thus try to better replicate the set of information upon which the judge
decides. We first test on the value of covariates at filing ; then using a
time-dependent model, we test the same model, the same plus the national
unemployment rate and also a shared-frailty assumption on the courts ; then
we look at the differentiated effect of the protection by an interaction of the
unemployment rate and the size of firms. The interaction with the size of
firms can tell us whether the bankruptcy judges adapt their response to lo-
cal economic turmoil depending on the firm’s size. The bigger the firm, the
more impact its liquidation would have. We conclude analysing the effect of
the unemployment rate on the survival of the reorganization plan.
Our tables list the coefficients of the Cox model. In order to make our
interpretations easier, we will compute hazard ratios in our analysis by taking
the exponential of the parameter estimates. If the coefficient in the table
is equal to b, its hazard ratio is exp(b) and its effect on the outcome is
exp(b) − 1%. Looking at Table 16, the coefficient of Forum shopping on
the reorganization plan event is −0.063 and exp(−0.063) = 0.939. Thus the
impact of forum shopping on the reorganization plan after filing is 6.1%.
5.1 Testing with variables at the time of filing
We start our analysis with the simplest model, i.e. with the values of all
variable at the time of filing (Table 16). In this setting no environment plays
a significant role in both samples except for the local unemployment rate.
We analyse this effect and comment in extenso the coefficients of the other
covariates since they remain mostly the same through all the other tests.
In both samples local unemployment rate displays the same sign and
level of significance – at the 5% level at least – to explain transition towards
reorganisation plan. This results holds despite the number of controls: an
increase of one point of local unemployment rate means an increase of 4.4%26
in the chances to agree on a continuation plan (3.7 % for firms with financial
information). In parallel, an increase in local unemployment rate also implies
an increase in the chances to liquidate the firm but with lesser magnitude
(1.4% in the whole population and 2.2 % in firms with financial information).
To sum up, the local unemployment rate delays both decisions but the higher
magnitude for the reorganization plan indicates a shift in distribution of
events. The two Cox models show that the decision of Courts are truly
affected but it is overall in favouring reorganization plans and to avoid sale
26In the rest of the paper I indicate the hazard ratios rather than coefficients since it
indicates the effect in term of probability
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as a going concern. The increase of the hazard rate of Liquidation can
be explained relative to the sale as going concern. Local economic turmoil
probably discourages potential buyers, with less business opportunity at the
time. It should also limit credit lending to finance these acquisitions.
We then analyse the coefficients of all the other time-invariant covariates.
The effect of size is in line with what we expect from other studies on the
French case (see Blazy et al. 2011 or Levratto, Tessier, and Zouikri 2011).
The bigger the firm, the lesser chances the attempt to reorganize the firm
fails, meaning the reorganization proceeding ends up converted to a Liqui-
dation. The coefficients are particularly strong and significant for the whole
population – the decrease in chances reaches 65 % for firms with more than
250 employees – yet they drop at a constant level for the population with
financials – chances to being liquidated drop of about 20%. This may be
due by our taking into account the financial information and in particular
the total assets but also because of the scarcity of balance sheet available for
firms with no known employee. The effects for the two other alternatives,
the reorganization plan and the sale as a going concern, are not linear but
complementary. They are the easier to read for the population with finan-
cials. The firms that have the greatest chances to agree on a continuation
plan are those with between 1 and 10 employees (14.9 %) and those with
more than 250 employees (62.5 %). While the firms “in between” from 10 to
249 employees are the more likely to be sold as a going concern. It is only
logical, external growth is the more feasible for mid-size firms big enough to
reach their breakdown point without being too hard to integrate.
Financial information have same coefficients as expected. The profitabil-
ity margin increases strongly the chances to agree on a reorganization plan
(28 %) and to sell the firm as a going concern (30.8%). The effect is negative
but non-significant on the risk of Liquidation which should be explained by
the high level of distress looking at at the distribution of level of profitability
margin in Table 7. It is also worthy to note that the trade debt actively
plays a role only for the chances to sell the firm with an increase of 6.7%
and decreases the chances of liquidation (-4.9%). It seems fair that junior
creditors want to avoid at all costs that the firm disappear since their re-
covery would be less plausible. On the other hand, a firm that supplies an
important debt to the bankrupt firm would value the latter all the more.
The impact of wages seems coherent with the results by Blazy et al. 2011.
We assume weight of wages to be a proxy for labour-intensity. The more
labour-intensive the firm, the less the judges prone to sell the firm with the
risk of layoffs. Also, the value of the firm may depend more on its human
capital, and thus make its valuation more difficult. Finally the volume of
fixed assets is only favorable for the reorganization plan (1.9 %) and plays
negatively on the sale as going concern (-6.5%) but above all on the risk of
liquidation (-14%). If the firm has managed to keep a large volume of fixed
assets, i.e. its investments, it has most probably an important bargaining
17
power vis-a-vis its debtors.
The effect of the size of total assets could be ambiguous. The bigger the
firm, the more important the firm may be in the local economy of the juris-
diction. But a large number of assets in a distressed firm may complicate its
reorganisation. The risk of being liquidated (8.6%) or sold as a going concern
(45%) increases with the volume of assets while the chances to reorganize
actually decreases. Since we also control for the volume of fixed assets and
trade debt, we mostly take into account here goodwill and current assets
less trade debt. The size of the coefficient on the eventuality of sale may
be because the bigger the firm, the more undervalued these assets can be ;
also insider management may need help from outsider investors to put into
motion a reorganization.
Last our data provide information on Forum Shopping, i.e. being judged
by another Court than the one the firm is registered to. To interpret the
covariate, one should wonder what would have happened if the firm had been
judged by its reference Court. The only consistent effect on both samples is
a strong increase in the risk of liquidation (15% for the whole population ; 18
% for firms with financial information). The impact on the eventuality of a
sale is only found in the whole population(+30%). Since it is not significant
when we can control for it with financials, we can infer that Forum shopping
is mainly used by the larger firms, the more concerned by the sale as going
concern.
5.2 Testing for time-dependent covariates
Conversely to the previous time-invariant model, once we allow for the en-
vironment variables to vary with time, they all have an incidence on the
decisions. The first result is that the effect of local unemployment remains
the same in terms of magnitude and significance level as in the model with
the values at filing. As shown by comparing the table 16 with table 12, the
changes stem from the significance level of the other environment variables.
The coefficients associated with the variation in GDP growth are negative
and significant to explain both reorganization plan and liquidation. Yet the
coefficient is stronger in the latter event (5% vs. 3.7%) and even increases
when we control for financials (10%). It is easier to read this effect consider-
ing a drop in GDP growth. A decrease in growth implies that the proceeding
lasts longer before reaching these two events but the detrimental effect of bad
times predominates over the possibility to reorganize the firm.
The only puzzling coefficient is the effect of firm creation rate on the
whole population which is strongly negative (-19%) and significant. But this
figure becomes mildly positive (1.8%) and not significant when we test with
the financial information.
As mentioned in the first section, Cox model can add a multiplicative
component in order to take into account heterogeneous unobserved effects
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based on a cluster, here each Commercial Court. Because of correlation issues
with this clustering assumption, we take out from the covariates the number
of bankruptcies in the past 12 months. The results underline the existence
of a local legal culture and the need for considering it to explain decisions
(Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 1994). It also stresses a differentiated
effect of the local unemployment rate.
Shared frailty models allows for testing the robustness of the intraclass
correlation, i.e. the relevance of the clustering assumption and the explaining
power of the heterogeneous effect of each Court. As shown in table 13, for
all transitions the variance is found to be significant. Its magnitude varies
with each transition and remains stable testing on the whole population or
controlling with financial information. It has the strongest effect when it
explains the agreement upon a reorganization plan (68% for the population;
56% for firms with financial information) ; it has a lesser effect on the sale
as a going concern (14%/13%) and weakly explains the risk of Liquidation
(3%). According to these results, there is a huge disparity on the firm that
are allowed to reorganize ; it is then that the disparities between courts
display the most importance ; while the decision to shut down a firm relies
on the same rationale everywhere.
The environment variables are in line and of the same order of magnitude
as those describe before except for the effect of the local unemployment on
the transition towards Liquidation in sample (b). The effect is smaller (0.6%)
and no longer significant.
5.3 Checking the effect of local unemployment rate
In order to clarify whether these decisions are local deviations, we derive
a simple test by adding both national and the gap between local and na-
tional rates. Results are reported in table 14. They confirm that the main
determinant driving reorganization plan is local. The national rate displays
no significant effect on the first outcome, i.e. the reorganisation plan. The
gap between unemployment rates display similar coefficients to the ones dis-
played before. This confirms that local changes are the main motives behind
the effects that we document.
On the other hand, Liquidation is strongly and only affected by the na-
tional unemployment rate (31.9% for the whole population/44.6% for firms
with financial information). The effect is thus proven stronger when we take
into account the financials of the firm while the variation in GDP remains sig-
nificant. These results indicate that the national unemployment rate stands
probably as a better proxy of the general economic context and its effect on
the perspectives of the firm as seen by the court. The judges can adapt their
decisions at a local level. They do not force reorganization of firms when the
overall economy worsens, proxied here by an increase of national unemploy-
ment rate. This can explain why Marinescu 2011 finds that an increase in
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this rate boosts decision against the employees. They adapt their decisions
but are not myopic about the consequences. This is confirmed latter on
when we test the interaction of local unemployment and size (see Table 15).
For the sale transition, the coefficient of the national unemployment rate is
highly negative and this result is consistent with our first model. Only the
agreement on a reorganization plan displays distinguishing results.
We now check whether Courts behave differently depending on the firm’s
size in the spirit of Blazy et al. 2011, who showed that the choice in buying
offer was directly affected by the number of employees. We wonder whether
the concern on local unemployment differs and increases with the firm’s size.
To do so we consider the interaction term between the rate and the size of
the firm.
The interpretation of interaction terms on Cox models is not straightfor-
ward. The impact of an increase of n points of the unemployment rate on
firms with 10 to 50 employees should be βunemployment+βunemploymentx10−50empl..
The results are reported in the Table 15.
There are multiple lessons. There is no clear effect of the local unemploy-
ment rate on the risk of Liquidation if we look at both population and sample
with financials. The significance of the coefficients for the whole population
drop to zero when we control for financials. An increase in local unemploy-
ment should only raise the risk of Liquidation for the firms with more than
250 employees but the interaction term is not significant. Concerning the
sale as a going concern we can only see a significant increase on the whole
population for the interaction term of the firm between 50 to 250 employees
(+3%), this effect remains true for the sample (b) but is no more significant.
The most striking result concerns the chances to reorganize. The coeffi-
cient of the local unemployment is now negative – though not significant for
sample (b) – but it must be interpreted with the addition of the interaction
terms. We thus found that the effect is overall on firms between 1 to 49 em-
ployees, the level of the sum of these coefficients is similar to what we found
before (around 3%). The effect for larger firms is less clear. Looking at both
samples, it appears to be null but also not significant. These findings can be
interpreted through the local concern of the courts. It is most plausible that
larger firms do not work in the sole perimeter of the jurisdiction but above
all can easily benefit from a national, media or political, concern. The firms
between 1 to 49 employees are the most locally embedded and those that
would benefit the most from these deviations.
5.4 Testing for the survival of prolonged firms after a reor-
ganization plan
We reckoned that the effect of the local unemployment is most probably time-
dependent. Furthermore the interpretation of the coefficients is to check the
effect of an increase relative to the average local unemployment rate between
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all the courts, not within each court. We thus derived a new variable to test
for the deviations from an increase in local unemployment. We look at the
gap between the actual rate and its mean value for each Court over the
6 years under study. We find no effect on the failure of the firms. This
new variable was motivated by the absence of effect when we used the local
unemployment rate alone. Also we attempt to take into account that the
effect of the unemployment rate is the highest at the time of the continuation
plan. To do so, we propose a second model (2) where we consider each of
the quarterly observations we used for the time-dependent model. We then
look at the chances of survival knowing these firms are the ones to get a
continuation plan. In order to decrease the autocorrelation issue, we cluster
the observation by firm (using its SIREN number).
In both models we look at the time before the decision following Bey-
ersmann, Allignol, and Schumacher 2012 on multi-stage models. But the
coefficient though significant in the model has no effect on the risk of failure.
Only three variables in our testing have a real impact and hamper the risk of
failure after a reorganization plan: the profitability margin (around -20%),
the size of the firm in terms of assets (around -10%) and the decision to
Forum Shopping (between -16% and -25%).
6 Conclusion
The local unemployment rate proved to affect the decision of French bankruptcy
courts after a firm has filed into Redressement Judiciaire and this result is
confirmed even after we run a number of tests done throughout the paper to
control any issue arising. It is most probably the result of Courts being not
only auditor of bankrupt firms but also political institutions of their juris-
diction. As such, they cannot prevent their decision to be politically charged
and to overcome a simple conflict resolution to try to being concerned with
non-investors. They are inclined to do so because of two features provided
by French law: they are elected among professionals from their jurisdiction
and they have a key role of French Courts in the bankruptcy process.
The consequences of the changes in local unemployment are to hasten
the decisions and increase the chances of a reorganization plan. One of the
two involved parties signing the reorganisation plan must have been invited
by the Court to do some effort on the recovery rates provided in the plan.
Also, these deviations resulting from the local context have no apparent
consequences on the firm’s survival. Both results should imply that the
firm’s creditors agree on cuts of recovery rate. The question these results
raises is whether these deviations are beneficial or not for the economy in
general. If the creditors are mostly other local businesses, such write-offs may
increase the risk of a domino effect. This fear may explain why we found
a differentiated effect of the unemployment rate depending on the size of
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firms. The interaction term is the highest and the most significant for firms
with fewer than 50 employees. If the creditors are mainly national banks,
the consequences may be unclear at a local level but the cost of credit should
probably increase. The cost/benefit analysis of this impact seems hard to
evaluate due to the lack of d data.
Our most striking result is the lack of effect on the survival of prolonged
firms. This result resembles the findings by Blazy et al. 2011; LoPucki and
Doherty 2007 on the effect of bankruptcy outcome on the global recovery
rate. Yet we may have limited information on the subject since a reorgani-
zation plan generally lasts over 10 years. Moreover we are only concerned
in this paper with the firm’s survival, not its performances. Maybe the firm
is under-performing with an increased risk of recidivism later on, i.e. filing
again for bankruptcy.
The significant impact of local economy proves that courts are obviously
embedded in the local economic tissue. They are driven by other motives
than the enforcement of law alone or the trade-off between going concern
and liquidation values. These findings are all the more concerning at a time
of bankruptcy reform, especially since they tend to inspire from Chapter 11
which gives an important weight to the court. For instance, Germany and
Spain have inserted “cram-down” procedures, i.e. the possibility for courts to
force their decisions, and thus have heightened the latter’s power. France is
also currently debating its future reforms. As shown in the MP mission, there
are big concerns on which structure of bankruptcy court to favor; the need
for professional judges rather than only local professionals was in question.
These results are also linked with the French situation and the weight
of Court in the decision. Yet local variables may still remain significant in
systems (such as the English one) where Courts are limited to an auditing
function. For instance, creditors with many businesses on a certain perimeter
such as a regional bank should also be aware of the local climate. Thus, they
must also care not to propagate financial difficulties among their customers.
Therefore, there is a need for testing these assumptions on different legal
systems and to check whether the characteristics of French judges really
explains the absence of effect on the firm.
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6.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2: Breakdown of events after filing by size (empl.)
The table displays how censoring and choices between events is affected by the firm’s
size.
Obs. Cens. Liquid. Closed Sold Plan
No empl. 1283 9% 65% 15% 2% 10%
Btw. 1 & 10 empl. 40188 6% 52% 16% 3% 24%
Btw. 10 & 49 empl. 11211 6% 41% 14% 13% 27%
Btw. 50 & 249 1497 5% 32% 11% 30% 21%
Above 250 empl. 168 6.5% 24.4% 6.5% 41.7% 21 %
Total 65,899 6% 52% 15% 5% 22%
Table 3: Length (in weeks)
The table displays information on the financials used in the tests. The “length in
months since financials” show these information remain valid for analysis. 75% are
less than 16 months old. All ratios have been winsorized at the 1st and 99th centile
because of asymptotic issues.
Obs. Mean Median Q1 Q3 sd
Censored 4,133 49.06 31.00 10.57 48.00 72.53
Liquidated 34,157 20.61 11.43 7.86 28.00 19.98
Closed 10,054 20.37 12.00 8.00 27.43 19.09
Sold 3,192 28.69 23.93 13.43 39.86 19.45
Plan 14,363 58.08 55.00 51.00 65.00 14.23
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Table 5: Summary statistics for categorical variables
The table displays information on the financials information used in the tests. The
“length in months since financials” show these information remain valid for anal-
ysis. 75% are less than 16 months old. All ratios have been winsorized at the 1st
and 99th centile because of asymptotic issues.
Obs. % Obs. Occurences
Dependent variables
Evt:Censored 65,899 0.063 4,133
Evt:Liquidated 65,899 0.518 34,157
Evt:Closed 65,899 0.153 10,054
Evt:Sold 65,899 0.048 3,192
Evt:Plan 65,899 0.218 14,363
Controls
Orig.:Creation 65,899 0.643 14,646
Orig.:Purchase 65,899 0.133 8,737
Orig.: Other 65,899 0.222 14,646
Legal:LLC 65,899 0.884 58,287
Legal: LLC with Board 65,899 0.027 1,753
Legal:Simpl. LLC 65,899 0.081 5,342
Legal : Other 65,899 0.008 517
Nb of empl.:None 65,899 0.195 12,835
Nb of empl.:Inf. to 10 65,899 0.61 40,188
Nb of empl.:Btw. 10&49 65,899 0.17 11,211
Nb of empl.:Btw. 50&249 65,899 0.023 1,497
Nb of empl.:Sup. to 250 65,899 0.002 168
Table 7: Breakdown of size (empl.) for financials
The table displays information on the financials information used in the tests. The
“length in months since financials” show these information remain valid for anal-
ysis. 75% are less than 16 months old. All ratios have been winsorized at the 1st
and 99th centile because of asymptotic issues.
Obs. Mean Median sd Q1 Q3
Last financials (months) 32,638 11.243 10.908 6.22 6.21 16.07
Fixed Assets/Equity 32,638 0.987 0.858 7.98 -0.24 1.92
Profit. margin 32,638 -0.099 -0.032 0.26 -0.13 0.02
Weight of wages 32,638 1.071 0.993 1.48 0.83 1.25
Ln(size) 32,638 12.567 12.466 1.38 11.66 13.37
Ln(Fixed Assets) 32,638 11.623 11.677 1.69 10.59 12.63
Ln(Payables) 32,638 11.184 11.124 1.67 10.09 12.24
Table 9: Breakdown of business sectors for financials
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This table provides the breakdown by business sectors of available financials in the
24 months before filing for bankruptcy. There are only two sectors with less than
half their firms
Obs Without
Financials
With
Financials
Manufacturing 8,737 31% 69%
Construction 19,183 50% 50%
Wholesale & retail 15,479 48% 52%
Transportation & storage 3,078 41% 59%
Accommodation & food
serv.
10,060 55% 45%
Inform. & Com. 2,013 48% 52%
Real estate activities 2,146 49% 51%
Administrative & support
activ.
3,705 52% 48%
Education 747 40% 60%
Arts, entert. & recre. 503 34% 66%
Energy, Water, Waste mgmt 248 38% 62%
Total 65,899 47% 53%
Table 10: Breakdown of size (nbr. of empl.) for financials
This table shows the breakdown by size of available financials in the 24 months before
filing for bankruptcy. Overall, more than half of the population displays available
data but the table also shows a size bias towards larger firms.
Obs. Without
Financials
With
Financials
No empl. 12,835 74% 26%
Btw. 1 & 10 empl. 40,188 47% 53%
Btw. 10 & 49 11,211 23% 77%
Btw. 50 & 249 empl. 1,497 17% 83%
Above 250 empl. 168 18% 82%
Total 65,899 47% 53%
6.2 Econometric analysis
Table 11: Testing the impact of local unempl. at filing with financials
This table provides an evaluation of the impact of the economic environment on the
two samples, i.e. the whole population (a) and the firms with available financials
(b). For controls, we had available the business sector, the age, the motive of
creation, the legal form and some sectorial ratios – the weights of labour and debts,
the variation in profitability margin and the weight of bank debts in total debts. All
three possible outcomes are considered : reorganization plan (1), sale as a going
concern (2) and conversion into Liquidation (3).
(1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b) (3b)
Forum Shopping −0.063 0.283∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ −0.101 0.009 0.162∗∗
(0.062) (0.093) (0.042) (0.076) (0.115) (0.065)
Environment :
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(1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b) (3b)
Var in GDP 0.010 0.010 0.020∗ −0.004 0.015 0.030
(0.016) (0.034) (0.012) (0.019) (0.038) (0.018)
Local unempl. rate 0.044∗∗∗ 0.003 0.014∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.022 0.022∗∗
(0.016) (0.025) (0.006) (0.019) (0.030) (0.010)
Firm creation rate 0.030 −0.133 −0.070 0.166 0.003 0.178∗
(0.097) (0.206) (0.062) (0.116) (0.242) (0.101)
Court characteristics :
Past proceedings 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Past Liquidation −0.004 0.000 −0.002 −0.003 −0.004 0.001
(0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002)
Past Sauvegarde 0.012 −0.007 −0.004 0.015∗ −0.003 −0.001
(0.007) (0.018) (0.005) (0.009) (0.021) (0.008)
Firm size :
Inf 10 empl. 0.226∗∗∗ 0.076 −0.484∗∗∗0.151∗∗∗ −0.131 −0.189∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.079) (0.014) (0.046) (0.118) (0.031)
[10; 50[empl. 0.045 1.126∗∗∗ −0.736∗∗∗0.070 0.443∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.082) (0.020) (0.053) (0.122) (0.039)
[50; 250[ empl. −0.026 1.502∗∗∗ −0.798∗∗∗0.133 0.376∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗
(0.068) (0.096) (0.050) (0.086) (0.142) (0.068)
> 249 empl. 0.265 1.742∗∗∗ −1.042∗∗∗0.629∗∗∗ 0.146 −0.200
(0.176) (0.148) (0.158) (0.200) (0.202) (0.198)
Financials :
F.A / Equity 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Profit margin 0.249∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ −0.034
(0.045) (0.099) (0.035)
Weight of wages −0.001 −0.035∗∗ −0.003
(0.007) (0.015) (0.006)
ln(Size) −0.116∗∗∗0.373∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.041) (0.015)
ln(Assets) 0.019∗ −0.065∗∗∗−0.151∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.022) (0.008)
ln(Payables) −0.011 0.067∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.028) (0.010)
Controls Yes
AIC 126067 33222 391228 80474 22603 137189
Num. events 14363 3192 34157 10085 2395 13639
Num. obs. 65899 65899 65899 33945 33945 33945
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 12: Testing the impact of local unempl. at filing with financials
and time-dependent variables
This table provides an evaluation of the impact of the economic environment on
the two samples and considering their effect as time-dependent. We add the same
controls than described in Table . All three possible outcomes are considered : re-
organization plan (1), sale as a going concern (2) and conversion into Liquidation
(3).
(1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b) (3b)
Forum Shopping −0.063 0.286∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ −0.094 0.015 0.161∗∗
(0.062) (0.093) (0.042) (0.076) (0.115) (0.065)
Environment :
Var in GDP −0.037∗∗ 0.006 −0.050∗∗∗−0.038∗ 0.010 −0.107∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.038) (0.013) (0.022) (0.044) (0.021)
Local unempl. rate 0.039∗∗∗ 0.006 0.015∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.015 0.019∗∗
(0.009) (0.020) (0.005) (0.011) (0.025) (0.008)
Firm creation rate 0.030 −0.042 −0.213∗∗∗−0.009 −0.006 0.018
(0.096) (0.197) (0.060) (0.116) (0.232) (0.097)
Court characteristics :
Past proceedings 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Past Liquidation 0.001 −0.003 −0.003∗ 0.001 −0.007 0.001
(0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002)
Past Sauvegarde −0.012 0.005 −0.009∗ −0.005 −0.002 −0.004
(0.007) (0.017) (0.005) (0.009) (0.020) (0.008)
Firm size :
Inf 10 empl. 0.225∗∗∗ 0.074 −0.481∗∗∗0.149∗∗∗ −0.142 −0.186∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.079) (0.014) (0.046) (0.117) (0.031)
[10; 50[ empl. 0.042 1.126∗∗∗ −0.735∗∗∗0.066 0.432∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.082) (0.020) (0.053) (0.122) (0.039)
[50; 250[ empl. −0.028 1.501∗∗∗ −0.790∗∗∗0.123 0.360∗∗ −0.127∗
(0.068) (0.096) (0.050) (0.086) (0.142) (0.069)
> 249 empl. 0.266 1.755∗∗∗ −1.037∗∗∗0.625∗∗∗ 0.130 −0.193
(0.177) (0.148) (0.158) (0.200) (0.202) (0.198)
Financials :
F.A / Equity 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Profit margin 0.249∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ −0.035
(0.045) (0.099) (0.035)
Weight of wages −0.002 −0.036∗∗ −0.003
(0.007) (0.015) (0.006)
ln(Size) −0.117∗∗∗0.373∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.041) (0.015)
ln(Assets) 0.018 −0.064∗∗∗−0.152∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.022) (0.008)
ln(Payables) −0.009 0.067∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.028) (0.010)
Controls Yes
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(1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b) (3b)
AIC 126039 33210 391098 80195 22557 136716
Num. events 14363 3192 34155 10052 2392 13603
Num. obs. 183753 183753 183753 111802 111802 111802
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 13: Testing the impact of environment with shared frailty
This table provides an evaluation of the impact of the economic environment on
the two samples with shared frailty and a frailty model following a gamma law.
This parametrization does not allow us to add the past proceedings in the explaining
variables. The variance of the Random Effect is always significant at the highest
level but largely differs among the alternatives. It is the highest for the continuation
plan. Otherwise, we have the same controls as those described in Table . All three
possible outcomes are considered : reorganization plan (1), sale as a going concern
(2) and conversion into Liquidation (3).
(1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b) (3b)
Forum Shopping −0.130∗∗ 0.192∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ −0.178∗∗ −0.050 0.095∗
(0.058) (0.089) (0.042) (0.071) (0.106) (0.057)
Environment :
Var in GDP −0.043∗∗ 0.001 −0.054∗∗∗−0.049∗∗ −0.004 −0.111∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.037) (0.012) (0.022) (0.043) (0.021)
Local unempl. rate 0.039∗∗∗ −0.017 0.017∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ −0.016 0.006
(0.009) (0.016) (0.005) (0.011) (0.019) (0.007)
Firm creation rate 0.031 0.002 −0.210∗∗∗−0.069 −0.034 −0.064
(0.094) (0.189) (0.060) (0.114) (0.221) (0.094)
Court characteristics :
Past Liquidation 0.001 0.011∗∗∗ −0.003∗ 0.000 0.007∗ 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Past Sauvegarde −0.014∗∗ 0.011 −0.009∗ −0.009 0.004 −0.009
(0.007) (0.015) (0.005) (0.008) (0.017) (0.006)
Firm size :
Inf 10 empl. 0.242∗∗∗ 0.080 −0.485∗∗∗0.145∗∗∗ −0.186 −0.194∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.079) (0.013) (0.045) (0.117) (0.031)
[10; 50[ empl. 0.058 1.144∗∗∗ −0.738∗∗∗0.046 0.394∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.081) (0.020) (0.053) (0.121) (0.039)
[50; 250[ empl. −0.043 1.525∗∗∗ −0.796∗∗∗0.080 0.339∗∗ −0.149∗∗
(0.067) (0.096) (0.050) (0.085) (0.141) (0.068)
> 249 empl. 0.312∗ 1.793∗∗∗ −1.043∗∗∗0.600∗∗∗ 0.070 −0.267
(0.175) (0.146) (0.158) (0.198) (0.200) (0.198)
Financials :
F.A / Equity 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Profit margin 0.251∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ −0.044
(0.044) (0.099) (0.035)
Weight of wages −0.001 −0.033∗∗ −0.004
(0.007) (0.015) (0.006)
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(1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b) (3b)
ln(Size) −0.129∗∗∗0.368∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.041) (0.015)
ln(Assets) 0.028∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗−0.150∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.022) (0.008)
ln(Payables) −0.006 0.069∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.028) (0.010)
Variance of RE 0.676∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
Controls Yes
AIC 258102 61440 703448 172254 43757 262652
Num. events 14363 3192 34155 10052 2392 13603
Num. obs. 183753 183753 183753 107698 107698 107698
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 14: Testing the impact of local and national unemployment rate
This table provides an evaluation of the impact of local unemployment rate control-
ling for the effect of national unemployment rate. The tests is on the two samples
with time-dependency. We add the same controls as those described in Table . All
three possible outcomes are considered : reorganization plan (1), sale as a going
concern (2) and conversion into Liquidation (3).
(1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b) (3b)
Forum Shopping −0.063 0.286∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ −0.094 0.015 0.154∗∗
(0.062) (0.093) (0.042) (0.076) (0.115) (0.065)
Environment :
Var in GDP −0.036∗ −0.006 −0.020 −0.038∗ −0.002 −0.057∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.038) (0.013) (0.023) (0.044) (0.022)
Local unempl. rate 0.045 −0.092∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.034 −0.070 0.363∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.056) (0.019) (0.037) (0.066) (0.032)
Local - national
unempl. rate
0.038∗∗∗ 0.021 −0.006 0.033∗∗∗ 0.030 −0.009
(0.009) (0.022) (0.005) (0.011) (0.027) (0.009)
Firm creation rate 0.032 −0.080 −0.191∗∗∗−0.009 −0.044 0.064
(0.096) (0.199) (0.060) (0.117) (0.234) (0.097)
Court characteristics :
Past proceedings 0.000 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Past Liquidation 0.001 −0.002 −0.004∗∗∗0.001 −0.007 −0.001
(0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002)
Past Sauvegarde −0.012 0.005 −0.009∗ −0.005 −0.003 −0.005
(0.007) (0.017) (0.005) (0.009) (0.020) (0.008)
Firm size :
Inf 10 empl. 0.225∗∗∗ 0.075 −0.480∗∗∗0.149∗∗∗ −0.141 −0.187∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.079) (0.014) (0.046) (0.118) (0.031)
[10; 50[ empl. 0.042 1.126∗∗∗ −0.732∗∗∗0.066 0.432∗∗∗ −0.189∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.082) (0.020) (0.053) (0.122) (0.039)
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(1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b) (3b)
[50; 250[ empl. −0.028 1.501∗∗∗ −0.785∗∗∗0.123 0.360∗∗ −0.121∗
(0.068) (0.096) (0.050) (0.086) (0.142) (0.069)
> 249 empl. 0.266 1.757∗∗∗ −1.039∗∗∗0.625∗∗∗ 0.135 −0.194
(0.177) (0.148) (0.158) (0.200) (0.202) (0.198)
Financials :
F.A / Equity 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Profit margin 0.249∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ −0.036
(0.045) (0.099) (0.035)
Weight of wages −0.002 −0.036∗∗ −0.003
(0.007) (0.015) (0.006)
ln(Size) −0.117∗∗∗0.374∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.041) (0.015)
ln(Assets) 0.018 −0.064∗∗∗−0.151∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.022) (0.008)
ln(Payables) −0.009 0.066∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.028) (0.010)
Controls Yes
AIC 126041 33209.143390912 80197 22557 136589
Num. events 14363 3192 34155 10052 2392 13603
Num. obs. 183753 183753 183753 111802 111802 111802
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 15: Testing the impact of local unemployment rate and its inter-
action with size
This table provides an evaluation of the differentiated impact of the economic en-
vironment depending on the firm’s size, on the two samples. We add the same
controls as those described in Table . All three possible outcomes are considered :
reorganization plan (1), sale as a going concern (2) and conversion into Liquidation
(3).
(1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b) (3b)
Forum Shopping −0.159∗∗∗0.247∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ −0.227∗∗∗−0.048 0.124∗
(0.059) (0.093) (0.042) (0.073) (0.115) (0.065)
Environment :
Var in GDP 0.011 −0.047 −0.130∗∗∗0.005 −0.035 −0.155∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.036) (0.013) (0.021) (0.042) (0.021)
Local unempl. rate −0.037∗∗ −0.072∗ −0.019∗∗∗−0.041 0.012 −0.011
(0.017) (0.041) (0.007) (0.025) (0.056) (0.016)
Firm creation rate −0.702∗∗∗0.701∗∗∗ 1.102∗∗∗ −0.798∗∗∗0.606∗∗∗ 0.945∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.185) (0.056) (0.104) (0.217) (0.092)
Court characteristics :
Past proceedings 0.000 0.000 −0.001∗∗∗0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Past Liquidation 0.002 −0.008∗ −0.011∗∗∗0.005∗ −0.014∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
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(1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b) (3b)
(0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002)
Past Sauvegarde 0.015∗∗ −0.017 −0.038∗∗∗0.023∗∗∗ −0.024 −0.022∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.017) (0.005) (0.008) (0.020) (0.008)
Firm size :
Inf 10 empl. −0.216 −0.330 −0.741∗∗∗−0.176 0.203 −0.249∗
(0.141) (0.356) (0.064) (0.212) (0.509) (0.144)
[10; 50[ empl. −0.377∗∗ 0.699∗∗ −1.024∗∗∗−0.335 0.781 −0.402∗∗
(0.160) (0.352) (0.090) (0.228) (0.500) (0.161)
[50; 250[ empl. −0.016 0.601 −1.031∗∗∗0.030 −0.042 −0.094
(0.282) (0.392) (0.215) (0.338) (0.537) (0.272)
> 249 empl. 0.255 1.222∗∗ −0.713 0.705 0.811 0.003
(0.715) (0.604) (0.681) (0.798) (0.771) (0.829)
Interactions with unemployment rate :
& <10 empl. 0.064∗∗∗ 0.046 0.015∗∗ 0.053∗∗ −0.040 0.004
(0.015) (0.041) (0.007) (0.024) (0.057) (0.015)
& [10; 50[empl. 0.066∗∗∗ 0.049 0.015 0.064∗∗ −0.040 0.020
(0.018) (0.040) (0.010) (0.025) (0.056) (0.017)
& [50; 250[ empl. 0.016 0.108∗∗ 0.015 0.034 0.055 −0.001
(0.031) (0.045) (0.023) (0.038) (0.059) (0.029)
& > 249 empl. 0.030 0.072 −0.045 0.024 −0.062 −0.018
(0.081) (0.069) (0.075) (0.088) (0.087) (0.089)
Financials :
F.A / Equity 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Profit margin 0.229∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.044) (0.099) (0.035)
Weight of wages 0.002 −0.036∗∗ −0.002
(0.007) (0.015) (0.006)
ln(Size) −0.152∗∗∗0.391∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.041) (0.015)
ln(Assets) 0.026∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗−0.167∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.022) (0.008)
ln(Payables) 0.028∗∗ 0.070∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.028) (0.010)
Controls Yes
AIC 179139 42768 477827 117108 29720 176080
Num. events 14363 3192 34155 10052 2392 13603
Num. obs. 183753 183753 183753 111802 111802 111802
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table 16: Testing the impact of local unemployment rate during the
reorganization plan
This table provides an evaluation of the consequences of the changes in decision for
the prolonged firms. We test wether the local unemployment rate still has an effect
on the survival of firm. We use the value at filing (model 1) and a time-dependent
model (2). The idea of the second model is to check over time between the filing and
the reorganization plan the effect of the local unemployment rate, and we cluster the
model with the firm under study to prevent biases in the error term. We add the
same controlsas those described in Table .
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Time before decision −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Forum Shopping −0.206∗∗ −0.299∗∗ −0.171∗ −0.272∗∗
(0.094) (0.120) (0.092) (0.124)
Environment :
Var in GDP −0.017 −0.012 −0.022∗∗ −0.016
(0.023) (0.027) (0.009) (0.011)
Local unempl. − aver. 0.016 0.001 −0.006 −0.008
(0.039) (0.047) (0.025) (0.030)
Firm creation rate 0.110 0.105 0.097 0.124
(0.139) (0.170) (0.103) (0.124)
Court characteristics :
Past proceedings 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Past Liquidation 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Past Sauvegarde −0.016 −0.017 −0.015 −0.016
(0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011)
Firm size :
Inf 10 empl. −0.018 0.016 −0.005 0.030
(0.043) (0.066) (0.043) (0.065)
[10; 50[empl. −0.009 0.095 0.012 0.134∗
(0.052) (0.078) (0.052) (0.078)
[50; 250[ empl. −0.002 0.198 0.032 0.252∗
(0.104) (0.132) (0.106) (0.131)
> 249 empl. −0.068 0.470 −0.036 0.635∗∗
(0.276) (0.303) (0.280) (0.294)
Financials :
F.A / Equity 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Profit margin −0.261∗∗∗ −0.212∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.066)
Weight of wages 0.027∗∗ 0.023∗
(0.011) (0.012)
ln(Size) 0.014 −0.009
(0.027) (0.028)
ln(Assets) −0.097∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016)
ln(Payables) 0.018 0.024
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(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
(0.018) (0.019)
Controls Yes
AIC 58412 36160 381810 239457
Num. events 6592 4450 31703 21244
Num. obs. 14363 10052 69785 48549
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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